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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this
appeal from the Third District Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(j) and may transfer this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals
pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 78-2-2(4) . The Utah Court of Appeals
has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2) (k) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court error in granting CTX's Motion

to Enforce the Settlement Agreement in this case, thereby allowing
CTX to unilaterally change the terms of the global settlement
offered to Rukavina. Should Rukavina be forced to settle this case
on terms involving the settlement of four other cases which were
never complied with. Should CTX be allowed to seek enforcement of
the separate terms of the global settlement offered in this case,
while proceeding contrary to the settlement offer in the other
cases.

Did CTX waive its right to claim a settlement in this case

by proceeding with litigation in this case and by proceeding with
litigation in the other cases.
a.

Standard of Review. The issue as to whether a

contract of settlement exists between the parties is a question of
law for the court to decide, and thus, is subject to a complete
review for correctness.

Hern Hughes & Sons Inc. v. Ouintek, 834

P.2d 582, 583 (Ut.App. 1992).
b.

Preservation for Review. This issue was raised

on CTX's Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement. (Record 711- 1-

712) .

The court made a ruling on the Motion subjecting it to

appellate review.
2.

(Record 897-899).

Did the trial court error in its ruling granting

CTX's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Striking Extrinsic
Evidence.
a.

Standard of Review.

The review of the trial

court's ruling on judgment on the pleadings is a question of law,
which does not require any deference to the trial court. Judgment
on the pleadings is only appropriate when the pleadings, viewed
with all inference in favor of the non-moving party, fail to show
any set of facts for which the non-moving party might recover.
Young v. Texas Co. , 331 P.2d 1099 (1953) . The trial court's ruling
on a judgment on the pleadings is subject to complete review for
correctness.

Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927 (Utah App. 1990),
b.

Preservation for Review. This issue was raised

on CTX's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Record 35-37). The
court made a ruling on the Motion subjecting it to appellate
review. (Record 121-122).
3.

Did the trial court error in ruling, as a matter of

law, that the option provision in the lease was too indefinite to
be enforceable, yet not ambiguous, so as to allow the consideration
of parol evidence.

Did the trial court error in failing to

consider parol evidence
provision.

in relation to the lease and option

Should the court have considered parol evidence in

determining whether or not the lease or option provision was
intended as an integrated contract.
- 2-

a.

Standard of Review,

The issue as to the

ambiguity of contractual language is a question of law, subject to
complete review for correctness.

Equitable Life & Casualty v.

Ross. 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Ut.App. 1993) cert, denied 860 P.2d 943.
b.

Preservation for Review. This issue was raised

on CTX's Motion to Strike Extrinsic Evidence. (Record 86-88). The
court made a ruling on the Motion preserving

the issue for

appellate review. (Record 121-122).
4.

Did the trial court error in retroactively reinstat-

ing the April 20. 1993 Judgment after it was vacated by the court
for lack of standing and jurisdiction, pursuant to § 16-10a-1502
UCA.

Can the court retroactively give a foreign corporation legal

standing to maintain an action.
a.

Standard of Review.

The review of the trial

court's interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which
does not require any deference to the trial court.
court's ruling is reviewed for correctness.

The trial

State v. Larsen. 865

P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993).
b.

Preservation for Review. This issue was raised

on CTX's Motion to Reinstate Judgment and for Judgment on the
Pleadings. (Record 290-291). The court made a ruling on the Motion
preserving the issue for appellate review.
5.

(Record 547-551).

Did the trial court error in denying Rukavina's

Motion to Amend.

Was it prejudicial to CTX Properties to allow

Rukavina to amend his Complaint in this case.

- 3-

a.

Standard of Review. The standard of review for

a motion to amend is abuse of discretion.

Christensen v. Jewekes,

761 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1988).
b.

Preservation for Review. This issue was raised

on Rukavina's Motion to Amend. (Record 310-331). The court made a
ruling on the Motion preserving the issue for appellate review.
(Record 547-551).
6-

Did the trial court error in striking Rukavina's

Motion to Enforce for the Settlement Agreement in CTX Properties
vs. Barney. 900903134 PR, which is based on a separate contract
from the lease and option provision ruled on in CTX's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings. Should the trial court have considered
the Settlement Agreement in CTX Properties vs. Barney. 900903134
PR, in this case, which is a separate contract from the lease and
option provision.
a.

Standard of Review.

The review of the trial

court's ruling on a motion to strike is a question of law, which
does not require any deference to the trial court.

Motions to

strike should be granted only when there are no disputed issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
ness.

The trial court's ruling is reviewed for correct-

Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927 (Utah App. 1990).
b.

Preservation for Review. This issue was raised

on Rukavina's Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement with
Barney, (Record 306-309), and CTX's Motion to Strike Rukavina's
Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement with Barney.
- 4-

(Record

403-406).

The court made a ruling on these Motions preserving the

issue for appellate review.
7.

(Record 549).

Did the trial court error in dismissing the Third

Party Complaint as against the Third Party Defendant Barney,
pursuant to Rule 4 URCP, after Barney had accepted service of the
Third Party Compliant and had filed an Answer in the case.
a.

Standard of Review.

The review of the trial

court's ruling on the interpretation of a statute is a question of
law, which does not require any deference to the trial court. The
trial court's ruling is reviewed for correctness. State v. Larsen,
865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993).
b.

Preservation for Review. This issue was raised

on CTX's Motion to Dismiss. (Record 471-473).

The court made a

ruling on this Motion preserving the issue for appellate review.
(Record 547-551).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. 16-10A-1502. Consequences of transacting
business without authority.
(1) A foreign corporation transacting business in this
state without authority, or anyone in its behalf, may not maintain
a proceeding in any court in this state until an application for
authority to transact business is filed with the division.
Utah Code Ann. 68-3-3. Retroactive effect.
No part of these revised statutes is retroactive,
unless expressly so declared.
U.R.C.P. Rule 4. Process.
* * *

(b) Time of Service. In an action commenced under Rule
3(a) (1) , the summons together with a copy of the complaint shall be
served no later than 120 days after the filing of the complaint
unless the court allows a longer period of time for good cause
shown. If the summons and complaint are not timely served, the
action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on application of any
- 5-

party or upon the court's own initiative. In an action brought
against two or more defendants on which service is obtained upon
one of them within the 120 days or such longer period as may be
allowed by the court, the other or others may be served or appear
at any time prior to trial.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Proceedings
On or about November 13, 1992, CTX Properties, ("CTX")
filed a Complaint against Andy Rukavina ("Rukavina") for eviction
and unlawful detainer of the premises at 5646 Magic Isle Lane,
Murray, Utah

("Property"), claiming that Rukavina's lease had

expired.
On or about December 2, 1992, Rukavina filed an Answer,
Counterclaim and Third

Party Complaint

alleging, among

other

things, that the lease contained an option to purchase which he
timely exercised, or in good faith attempted to exercise, entitling
him to possession of the property.
Rukavina also

filed a Counterclaim and Third Party

Complaint against CTX, Michael Wright, Jill Wright (principals of
CTX Properties) and Eloise Barney (an employee of CTX Properties)
to enforce the option provision, or in the alternative, to recover
costs for his improvements to the property, and to recover the
additional 20% payments he made during the lease term, based on the
option provision and representations made to him by CTX and the
Third Party Defendants, that the cost of his improvements and
additional payments would be credited towards his purchase price of
the property.

- 6-

Course of the Proceedings
and Disposition Below
On January 28, 1993, CTX filed a Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings based on the argument that the option provision in
the lease failed to state a purchase price and thus, as a matter of
law, was too indefinite to be enforceable, yet was not vague or
ambiguous so as to allow the court to consider extrinsic evidence.
(Record

35-37).

Rukavina

filed

a Memorandum

in Opposition

asserting that the option provision was ambiguous in its relation
to a purchase price (Record 77-85) and submitted Affidavits from
Rukavina and Barney (the employee of CTX who negotiated the lease)
setting forth the specific terms that were agreed to by the parties
when the lease was entered into, including their agreement to
calculate a purchase price for the option. (Record 38-69).
The Affidavit of Barney shows that CTX agreed to honor
the lease and the option provision at a later time in a separate
contract, that being a Settlement Agreement reached in a case
previously filed between Barney and CTX in the Third District
Court, CTX Properties vs. Barney, 900903134 PR.

The Affidavit of

Rukavina shows that he performed throughout the five year lease
under the terms of the agreement he reached with Barney of CTX, to
be able to exercise the option.
CTX filed a Motion to Strike the Extrinsic Evidence and
to Strike any Reference

to the Settlement Agreement

Properties vs. Barney, 900903134 PR. (Record 86-88).

in CTX

Judge Stirba

granted CTX's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and granted
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CTX's Motion to Strike, on April 5, 1993. An Order was entered on
April 20, 1993.

(Record 121-127).

The April 20, 1993 Order was later vacated by the court
in November 1994, for lack of jurisdiction.

This was based on the

fact that CTX was a foreign corporation not registered to do
business in Utah and thus lacked standing to bring suit, pursuant
to § 16-10a-1502 (1) UCA. (Record 237-243).

The court vacated the

judgment and the parties stipulated that CTX could retain possession of the home.
20,

The court reserved ruling on whether the April

1993 Judgment was void or voidable under § 16-10a-1502.

(Record 304-305) .
On December 9, 1994, Rukavina filed a Motion to Amend the
Complaint, Answer and Counterclaim.

(Record 310-331); a Motion to

Enforce the Option Agreement contained in the lease (Record 322335) ; and a Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement in CTX
Properties vs. Barney, 900903134 ?R, wherein CTX agreed with Barney
to honor the lease and option provision with Rukavina.

(Record

306-309) .
CTX filed a Motion to Reinstate the Judgment on the
Pleadings (Record 292-299), a Motion to Compel Discovery (Record
268-269), a Motion to Strike Rukavina's Motion to Enforce the
Option Agreement and to Strike Rukavina's Motion to enforce the
Settlement Agreement in CTX Properties vs. Barney, 900903134 PR,
(Record 407-412) and a Motion to Dismiss the Third Party Complaint
due to the lack of timely service under Rule 4 (b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. (Record 471-473).
- 8-

The Third Party Defendant,

Barney, had already accepted service of the Third Party Complaint
(Record 423-425) and had filed an Answer to the Third Party
Complaint.

(Record 531-538).

These motions were heard by the court on January 30,
1995.

The court granted CTX's Motion to Reinstate the April 20,

1993 Judgment, allowing CTX's standing and jurisdiction to be
applied retroactively.

The court, took under advisement whether

the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings should be converted to a
motion for summary judgment, in consideration of the affidavits and
exhibits submitted by the parties and whether the lease was
intended as an integrated contract to the exclusion of extrinsic
evidence.

The court indicated that it would review the complete

file and issue a written ruling.

(Record 470, 545). No written

ruling was issued.
Rukavina's Motion to Amend was denied as untimely and
prejudicial to CTX. (Record 549) .

Based on the denial of the

Motion to Amend and the granting of CTX's Motion to Reinstate
Judgment on the Pleadings, the court granted CTX's Motion to Strike
Rukavina's Motions for Enforcement of the Option Agreement and the
Enforcement of the Settlement Agreement in CTX Properties vs.
Barney.

(Record 549) .

The court also dismissed the Third Party

Complaint as against the Third Party Defendants for lack of timely
service (Record 814-816), although Third Party Defendant Barney
executed an Acceptance of Service and filed an Answer in the case.
(Record 547-551).

The remaining issues, i.e., reimbursement for

improvements and the 20% additional payments, were set for trial.
- 9-

CTX simultaneously with this case, was pursuing four
other cases, which involved Rukavina or his immediate family
members.

CTX Properties v. Anthony Duran. Civil No. 930904765 CN;

ASR Inc. v. Mark Duran, Civil No. 920906315 PR, Rukavina v.
Triatlantic. Civil No. 910907087 CV, and CTX Properties vs. Barney,
900903134 PR (the one mentioned before with Barney, a former CTX
employee).

Mark Duran and Anthony Duran, are step-brothers of

Rukavina and both signed similar lease and option contracts with
CTX and ASR Inc., (ASR Inc. is an alleged successor-in-interest to
CTX) to purchase their homes in the Murray, Utah area.

CTX was

seeking to evict Mark Duran and Anthony Duran from each of their
homes.

Rukavina's mother was and is currently living with Anthony

Duran in his home.

(Record 817-818, 824-825) .

On March 14, 1995, CTX's legal counsel sent a letter to
Rukavina's counsel offering a global settlement of all five cases.
The letter states, "[m]y clients are desirous of settling, finally,
all of the above actions, but is only willing to settle them
together as a package." (Record 720).

This letter entailed among

other things, the payment to Rukavina of $2,500.00 for dismissal of
this case, plus the payment of $2,500.00 to Mark Duran for the
dismissal of his case and most importantly that Anthony Duran would
be able to purchase his home, where he and Rukavina's mother have
been living for over the past five years (emphasis added) . In the
purchase of Anthony Duran's home, it provided that each party could
submit an appraisal to determine the purchase price.

- 10 -

(Record 721) .

There were modifications made to the offer on two of the
cases, i.e., Anthony Duran could obtain payment of $2,500.00 if he
provided independent financing for the purchase of his home and
Triatlantic would forgive its judgment for costs against Rukavina
in Rukavina v. Triatlantic, No. 910907087 CV.

(Record 825).

While Settlement Agreements were being prepared for
signature, the parties continued to negotiate terms regarding the
purchase of Anthony Duran's home.

Anthony Duran had obtained an

appraisal for $71,500.00 on the home, and requested that he be able
to submit

this appraisal

in determining

the purchase price.

Rukavina and Anthony Duran both requested that this be expressly
provided for in the Settlement Agreements.

CTX, however, refused

to agree to this. As a result, the Settlement Agreements prepared
were never agreed to or executed in any of the cases.

(Record 825-

826) .
During this period of time, CTX continued with litigation
in this case.

There was a Scheduling Conference held and a new

trial date was set for May 23, 1995, (Record 698) and CTX proceeded
with its Renewed Motion to Compel against Rukavina, which was heard
by the court on April 3, 1995, more than two weeks after the March
14, 1995 letter and while the parties were still discussing terms
for the purchase of Anthony Duran's home.

(Record 709-710).

Then on April 10, 1995, CTX Properties filed Motions to
Enforce the Settlement Agreement in this case (Record 711-713) and
in the other cases.

In Mark Duran's case, Judge Iwasaki found no

meeting of the minds as to all the essential terms and denied CTX's
- 11 -

Motion to Compel Settlement. (See Addendum, Exhibit "F") .

In

Anthony Duran's case, CTX withdrew their Motion to Compel Settlement and continued with eviction proceedings against Anthony Duran
and Rukavina's mother.

(See Addendum Exhibit "G").

The agreement

that Anthony Duran would be able to purchase his home was a major
factor in Rukavina's agreement to the global settlement.

CTX's

Motion to Compel Settlement in Rukavina v. Triatlantic was also
denied by Judge Wilkinson.

(See Addendum Exhibit "H") . (This case

is currently on appeal, on other grounds, before the Utah Supreme
Court, Appeal No. 950172) .
There was no agreement reached with Rukavina regarding
the settlement of CTX Properties v. Barney, and this, although it
is contained in the letter of March 14, 1995, was not included in
any of the Settlement Agreements prepared.
At the hearing on June 12, 1995, CTX for the first time
indicated that it wanted to unilaterally separate the settlement
offer made in this case from the global settlement first proposed.
Rukavina never would have agreed to settle this case on the terms
offered in this case alone, without the settlement of the other
cases, and particularly without the agreement that Anthony Duran
would be able to purchase his home.

CTX actually withdrew its

Motion for Settlement in Anthony Duran's case and was proceeding
with eviction.
Although Rukavina is not a party the Anthony Duran case,
he is a party in this case and in Rukavina v. Triatlantic in which
Judge Wilkinson denied settlement and which is currently on appeal,
- 12 -

on

other grounds, before the Utah Supreme Court.

(Appeal No.

950172) .
Judge Stirba allowed CTX to unilaterally separate the
terms of the global settlement offered and granted CTX's Motion to
Enforce Settlement in this case, while allowing CTX to continue
with litigation in the other cases. A final order was entered on
September 20, 1995.

(Record 897-900).

This appeal is from the final order of Judge Stirba
entered on September 20, 1995, granting CTX's Motion to Enforce the
Settlement Agreement.

Appeal is also taken from Judge Stirba's

ruling granting CTX's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and to
Strike

Extrinsic

Stirba's

Evidence, entered

ruling retroactively

on April 20, 1993; Judge

reinstating

the April

20, 1993

Judgment after it was vacated; Judge Stirba's denial of Rukavina's
Motion to Amend; Judge Stirba's ruling striking Rukavina's Motion
for Enforcement of the Lease and Option Provision; and Striking
Rukavina's Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement in CTX
Properties vs. Barney, 900903134 PR; and Judge Stirba's dismissal
of the Third Party Complaint as against the Third Party Defendant
Eloise Barney, after Barney had accepted service and filed an
Answer in the case.
Statement of Facts
1.

In 1987, Eloise Barney, Property Manager for CTX

Properties, inquired whether Rukavina would be interested

in

renting certain real property belonging to CTX Properties commonly
known as 5646 Magic Isle Lane.

Rukavina informed Ms. Barney that
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he was not interested in renting a 4-bedroom house.

(Record 203,

214) .
2.

Ms. Barney approached Rukavina again with an offer

to lease the property for an extended period with an option to
purchase the property at the end of that period, certain amounts of
the rental payments during the lease (20%), would also be credited
toward the down payment or purchase price of the property.

(Record

203, 214) .
3.

Ms. Barney, as agent and Property Manager for CTX

Properties, negotiated and drafted, with the direct assistance of
Wright, the lease and option agreement entered into between CTX
Properties and Rukavina.
4.

(Record 213-214).

It was agreed between CTX and Rukavina, at the time,

that the sales price on the option was to be determined by Rukavina
obtaining an appraisal and CTX obtaining an appraisal at the end of
the lease, and then taking the average of the two appraisals.
(Record 214) .
5.

Rukavina agreed to lease the property in reliance on

the representation by Ms. Barney that through the option to
purchase, he could become the owner at the end of the lease. On or
about July 1, 1987, the lease was signed by Ms. Barney as Property
Manager for CTX and by Rukavina.

(Record 214) . The lease was for

a five year period from July 1, 1987 through July 1, 1992.

(Lease

is Exhibit "A" to Complaint, Record 5).
6.

Ms. Barney and Rukavina agreed to a purchase price

for the option at the time the lease was signed, by taking the
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average of two appraisals to be obtained by each party at the end
of the lease. (Record 2 04) . The following language was expressly
added to the lease form used by CTX Properties:
At the time of the expiration of said lease,
20% of lease payments shall either be credited
toward the down payment or towards the purchase price of the above-referenced home.
Each agent shall obtain a separate appraisal
and at that time a fair sales price shall be
determined. (Record 9)
7.

Rukavina also relied on CTX's promise to finance the

purchase, if Rukavina so elected, at the end of the lease.

(Record

205) .
8.

In 1987 Rukavina took possession of the property and

made payments during the term of the lease which included the 20%
premium, over and above the prevailing market rental rates, for the
option provision. (Record 204) .
9.

In 1990 CTX initiated a lawsuit against Eloise C.

Barney, CTX Properties, Inc. v. Eloise C. Barney. Civil No.
900903134 PR, which resulted in the execution of a Settlement
Agreement, wherein Eloise C. Barney settled her claims with Michael
Wright and CTX Properties.
10.

(Record 215).

As a condition of said settlement, Barney, aware of

the agreement and representations made with Rukavina regarding his
lease and property, required that Michael Wright and CTX Properties
agree to honor Rukavina's lease and option agreement for the
purchase of his home at 5646 South Magic Isle Lane, the property at
issue in this case.

(Record 215) .

provides:
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The Settlement Agreement

(6) Wright et. al. have agreed and do hereby agree
that certain real property leases (described in the
Fourth Cause of Action of Wright's Complaint) made for or
on behalf of Wright et. al., as lessor, . . . with Andy
Rukavina respecting the real property known as 5646 South
Magic Isle Lane, Murray, Utah, are valid and binding
lease agreements which contain a valid option to purchase
as more fully set forth in the lease copies in the
possession of Wright et. al., Wright et. al. agrees for
the benefit of the persons aforedescribed who are the
lessees stated in such leases that Wright et. al. will
honor the terms of such leases and the options to
purchase stated therein and waive any damage claim or
other claims arising out of the recording of notices of
interest that were filed of record by such parties.
(Record 221).
11.

It was intended that Rukavina be a beneficiary of

the foregoing provision, in that it was to resolve any and all
disputes over the option to purchase.

(Record 216).

As a further

condition of settlement, Michael Wright and CTX Properties waived
any damage claims they may have against Rukavina for any Notice of
Interests filed on the property by Rukavina.
12.

(Record 221).

CTX Properties indicated to Rukavina that CTX would

honor the option in the lease. In a letter dated February 27, 1992
from Paul T. Moxley, CTX's legal counsel, to L. Benson Mabey, legal
counsel for Rukavina, Mr. Moxley indicated that Rukavina should
contact Michael Wright within thirty

(30) days prior to the

exercise of the option if he was interested in exercising the
option.

(Record 204, letter record 207).
13.

Rukavina gave written notice to CTX Properties that

he intended to exercise his option and become the owner of the
property.

(Record 204).
14.

Rukavina obtained an appraisal on the property for

$67,000.00 and submitted it to CTX in accordance with the option
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language in the lease and the agreement reached by the parties to
calculate a purchase price.
15.

(Record 204).

CTX Properties also obtained an appraisal on the

property for $78,500.00 in accordance with the option language in
the lease and the agreement reached by the parties to calculate a
purchase price.

Rukavina tendered $72,750.00 the average of the

two appraisals to purchase the property.
16.

(Record 204).

In a letter dated September 2, 1992, CTX indicated

that it would accept $72,750.00, the average of the two appraisals,
as the purchase price.

CTX also agreed to provide financing at 2

1/2 points above prime.

(Record 205, letter record 211) The only

issue remaining concerned any amounts to be given as credits to
Rukavina's purchase price of the property.
17.

(Record 205, 211).

Suddenly, CTX would not allow Rukavina to purchase

the property unless he dropped an unrelated lawsuit against Michael
Wright (principal of CTX) titled Rukavina v. Triatlantic Ventures,
Inc. . et al. . Civil No. 910907087 CV.

When Rukavina refused to

drop the lawsuit against Wright, CTX began this eviction proceeding
on November 13, 1992.
18.

Rukavina

(Record 1-15, 205, 211).
relied on the validity of the option

provision contained in the lease drafted by CTX. He believed that
he was entitled to possession of the property pursuant to the lease
and option agreement and under the Settlement Agreement reached in
CTX Properties vs. Barney. 900903134 PR wherein CTX specifically
agreed to honor the option in Rukavina's lease.
221) .
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(Record 215-216,

19.

Rukavina filed an Answer, Counterclaim and Third

Party Complaint on December 2, 1992, alleging that he timely
exercised his option to purchase. Rukavina also counterclaimed and
complained against Third Party Defendants, Michael Wright, Jill
Wright and Eloise Barney, for declaratory relief that the option to
purchase was valid and timely exercised, or in the alternative for
the costs of his improvements on the property and additional rent
payments made for the option.
20.

(Record 19-27).

As to Rukavina7s Answer, Counterclaim and Third

Party Complaint, the counterclaim was answered by CTX on December
28, 1992.

(Record 28-34).

On January 17, 1995, Third Party

Defendant, Eloise Barney, accepted service of the Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint and filed an Answer, Counterclaim
and Cross-claim on February 16, 1995.
21.

(Record 531-538).

On January 28, 1993, CTX filed a Motion for Judgment

on the Pleadings.

(Record 35-37).

Rukavina filed a memorandum in

opposition and submitted affidavits setting forth the specific
terms reached to determine the purchase price for the option to
purchase the property and also the settlement reached in CTX
Properties v. Barney, 900903134 PR, wherein CTX agreed to honor the
lease and option provision entered into with Rukavina for the
property.

(Record 38-69).
22.

CTX filed a Motion to Strike the Extrinsic Evidence

and to Strike any Reference to the Settlement Agreement in CTX
Properties vs. Barney. 900903134 PR.

(Record 86-88). Judge Stirba

granted CTX's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and granted
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CTX's Motion to Strike, on April 5, 1993. An Order was entered on
April 20, 1993.
23.

(Record 121-127).

The April 20, 1993 Order was later vacated by the

court in November 1994, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
This was based on the fact that CTX Properties was a foreign
corporation not registered to do business in Utah and thus lacked
standing to bring suit, pursuant to § 16-10a-1502(1) UCA.
237-243) .

(Record

The court vacated judgment and the parties stipulated

that CTX could retain possession of the home.

The court reserved

ruling on whether the April 20, 1993 Judgment was void or voidable
under § 16-10a-1502.
24.

(Record 304-305).

On November 18, 1994, the court held a Scheduling

Conference. A bench trial was set for March 28, 1995. A discovery
deadline was set for February 28, 1995; and a cut-off date for
filing motions was set for December 9, 1994.

The Court also set

January 30, 1995 as a date to hear all pending motions.

(Record

303) .
25.

On December 9, 1994, Rukavina filed a Motion to

Amend the Complaint, Answer and Counterclaim (Record 310-331); a
Motion to Enforce the Option Agreement contained in the lease
(Record 322-335); and a Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement
in CTX Properties vs. Barney, 900903134 PR, whereby CTX agreed with
Barney to honor the lease and option provision with Rukavina.
(Record 306-309) .
26.

CTX Properties filed a Motion to Reinstate the

Judgment on the Pleadings (Record 292-299), a Motion to Compel
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Discovery (Record 268-269), a Motion to Strike Rukavina's Motion to
Enforce the Option Agreement and to Strike Rukavina's Motion to
enforce the Settlement Agreement in CTX Properties vs. Barney.
900903134 PR, (Record 407-412) and a Motion to Dismiss the Third
Party Complaint for lack of jurisdiction, due to the lack of timely
service under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(Record

471-473) .
27.

The

Third

Party

Defendant,

Eloise

Barney, had

already accepted service of the Third Party Complaint (Record 423425) and had filed an Answer to the Third Party Complaint.

(Record

531-538).
28.

On January 30, 1995, the court granted CTX's Motion

to Reinstate the April 20, 1993 Judgment, allowing standing and
jurisdiction to be applied retroactively.

The court, took under

advisement whether the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings should
be converted to a motion for summary judgment, in consideration of
the affidavits and exhibits submitted by the parties, and whether
the lease was intended as an integrated contract to the exclusion
of extrinsic evidence.

The court indicated that it would review

the complete file and issue a written ruling.

(Record 470, 545).

No written ruling was issued.
29.

Rukavina's Motion to Amend was denied as untimely

and prejudicial to CTX. (Record 549).

Based on the denial of

Rukavina's Motion to Amend and its Reinstatement of Judgment on the
Pleadings, the court granted CTX's Motion to Strike Rukavina's
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Motions for Enforcement of the Option Agreement and the enforcement
of the Settlement Agreement.
30.

(Record 549).

The court also dismissed the Third Party Complaint

as against the Third Party Defendants for lack of timely service
(Record 814-816), although Third Party Defendant Eloise Barney had
executed an Acceptance of Service and filed an Answer in the case.
(Record 547-551).
31.

In an attempt to negotiate a settlement of this case

and four other cases involving CTX Properties, including CTX
Properties v. Anthony Duran, Case No. 930904765CN; ASR. Inc. v.
Mark and Lynette Duran. Case No. 920906315PR; and Andy Rukavina v.
Triatlantic Ventures. Case No. 910907087CV, a letter was received
from CTX's legal counsel, Paul Moxley, dated March 14, 1995. This
letter offered and required a global settlement of all the abovereferenced cases based on the terms set forth in the letter.

The

letter states that CTX is only willing to settle all the cases
together as a package.
32.

(Record 825, letter record 720-721).

In discussion of the proposed global settlement

offer telephone conversations were had on March 15, 1995, wherein
further concessions were made.

It was agreed that Anthony Duran

would be paid the sum of $2,500.00, if he obtained independent
financing for the purchase of his home; and Michael Wright would
forgive the judgment he has for costs against Rukavina in the case
of Andy Rukavina v. Triatlantic Ventures. Civil No. 910907087 CV.
(Record 825).
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33.

It was proposed that Anthony Duran would be able to

purchase from CTX the home at 60 West Stauffer Lane, Murray, Utah,
in which he is living.

This property is the subject of litigation

in the case of CTX Properties, Inc. v. Anthony Duran, Case No.
930904765CN.

It was agreed that the purchase price would be

determined by averaging two appraisals, one from each party.
(Record 825).
34.

Anthony Duran had already obtained an appraisal on

the home for $71,500.00, of which CTX was aware.

On March 16,

1995, a letter was sent to Mr. Moxley from Rukavina's counsel
accepting CTX's global settlement offer, as contained in the March
14, 1995 letter.
35.

(Record 825-826, letter record 723).

While the settlement documents were being prepared,

the request was made that the settlement documents expressly
provide that Anthony Duran would be able to submit his $71,500.00
appraisal in determining the purchase price of his home. This was
not agreed to and the request was denied.

(Record 826) . There was

no mention of which appraisals could be used in the letter.
(Record 720-723).
36.

The settlement documents, as drafted, were not

accepted by Rukavina, Anthony Duran or the other parties in the
other cases.

The settlement documents as drafted were not agreed

to and were not signed by Rukavina or the other parties in the
other cases. (Record 826-827) .
37.

After the global settlement offer and letters of

March 14th and 15th, the parties continued to negotiate a settle- 22 -

ment of all the cases and continued with litigation in this case.
CTX elected to proceed with its Motion to Compel against Rukavina
and Motion to Dismiss the Third Party Complaint against Rukavina.
These Motions were heard on April 3, 1995.
38.

(Record 709).

On April 10, 1995, CTX filed its Motion to Enforce

Settlement in all the cases referenced in the March 14, 1995,
letter.

(Record 711-713).
39.

CTX then withdrew its Motion to Enforce Settlement

in the Anthony Duran case and proceeded with eviction proceedings.
(See Exhibit "G", hereto).

CTX's Motions to Enforce Settlement in

the other cases were denied.
40.

(See Exhibits "F" & "H", hereto).

The court heard oral argument on CTX's Motion to

Enforce Settlement on June 12, 1995 and granted CTX's Motion to
Enforce Settlement.

(Record 867). On September 20, 1995, after

several objections a Second Revised Order and Judgment was entered.
(Record 897-899) .
1995.

The Notice of Appeal was filed September 29,

(Record 901).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in granting CTX's Motion to Enforce

the Settlement

Agreement, which was being made as a global

settlement of several cases, to which the parties never agreed on
all of the terms.

CTX should not be allowed to unilaterally

withdraw its offer to settle all of the cases as proposed, in an
attempt to hold Rukavina to the settlement terms discussed in this
case, in anticipation of the total settlement of five cases.
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The trial court erred in granting CTX's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings.

In accepting

the allegations in

Rukavina's pleadings as true, as required on a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, Rukavina could have been entitled to possession
of the property pursuant to the option provision contained in the
lease, by the affirmative promises made by CTX, by the waiver by
CTX, and/or the Settlement Agreement entered into by CTX and
Barney, whereby CTX agreed to honor Rukavina's lease and option
provision.
The trial court erred in finding the lease unambiguous as
a matter of law, and thus, precluding parol evidence concerning the
option provision.

The

language

in the option provision is

ambiguous and the trial court should have considered parol evidence
regarding the option provision and the purchase price.

The trial

court, at a minimum, should have considered parol evidence to first
determine whether the lease and option provision was intended as an
integrated contract before excluding evidence under the parol
evidence rule. The trial court failed to make this determination.
The trial court erred in striking Rukavina's Motion to
Enforce the Settlement Agreement in CTX Properties v. Barney.
Rukavina is clearly a third party beneficiary to this contract,
being named therein, and the Settlement Agreement specifically
refers to Rukavina and the enforcement of the option provision and
lease at issue in this case.

Rukavina's Motion to Enforce this

Settlement Agreement should not have been stricken, but should have
been considered on the merits by the court.
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The trial court erred in reinstating the April 20, 1993,
Judgment which was previously vacated for lack of standing and
jurisdiction, pursuant

to 16-10a-1502 UCA, which precludes a

foreign corporation from bringing or maintaining an action in the
State until an application is filed with the division.

The court

does not have jurisdiction over any matter brought by a foreign
corporation until an application is filed and this jurisdiction
cannot be retroactively applied.
The trial court abused its discretion in not allowing
Rukavina to amend his complaint. CTX had plenty of opportunity to
answer the amended complaint and complete discovery before trial.
Finally, trial court erred in dismissing the Third Party
Complaint against Barney under Rule 4 URCP for untimely service,
after Barney had accepted service of the Third Party Complaint and
had filed an Answer to the Third Party Complaint.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING CTX'S MOTION
TO ENFORCE A SETTLEMENT OFFER MADE AFTER CTX
UNILATERALLY CHANGED THE TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT
OFFER AND PROCEEDED CONTRARY TO ITS TERMS.
In order for a settlement agreement to be enforced, it

must meet all the essential elements of a contract. Goodmanson v.
Liberty Vending Systems, 866 P.2d 581, (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
In this case an offer was made to settle this case in a
package deal with four other cases, currently pending before the
Third District Court. CTX then refused to settle all the cases as
discussed. One of the cases to be settled was CTX Properties, Inc.
v. Anthony Duran. Civil No. 930904765 CN, before the Honorable
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William B. Bohling.

In that case, CTX agreed that Anthony Duran,

a step-brother of Rukavina, could purchase the home at 60 West
Stauffer Lane, Murray, Utah,

This was important to Rukavina,

because Anthony Duran and Rukavina's mother were currently living
in this home.
It was agreed that the purchase price of Anthony's home
would be the average of two appraisals, one to be submitted by each
party.

Anthony Duran had obtained an appraisal in the amount of

$71,500.00.

In settlement Anthony Duran and Rukavina requested

that Anthony be able

to submit

the

$71,500.00

appraisal

in

averaging the price for the home, and they requested that the
Settlement Agreements expressly provide for this.
CTX refused to agree to this.

As a result, the settle-

ment agreements, as prepared, were not agreed to or executed by
Anthony Duran or Rukavina.

None of the settlement agreements

prepared in the other four cases have been agreed to or executed by
the parties in each case.
The parties knew and understood that there had not been
an understanding reached on all the terms of the global settlement
offer discussed.

The parties' conduct

is evidence of this.

Rukavina refused to execute the Settlement Agreement and CTX
elected

to continue with litigation

in all the cases.

CTX

continued with its Motion to Compel Discovery and its Motion to
Dismiss the Third-Party Complaint, which were heard on April 3,
1995, more than two weeks after the global settlement offer was
discussed.
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The settlement offer made in this case was a package
deal, requiring the settlement of four other cases, pending before
the Third District Court. The parties failed to reach a meeting of
the minds concerning all the essential terms in settling all five
cases,
Specifially, the parties failed to agree on a purchase
price for Anthony Duran's home, which was a major consideration
discussed in the settlement of this case.

As a result, Rukavina

did not execute the proposed Settlement Agreement and CTX continued
with litigation.

It was improper for the trial court to enforce

the limited terms of the proposed Settlement Agreement in this
case, when the settlement agreement discussed was conditioned on
the settlement of four other cases.
Furthermore, the other cases which were part of the
global

settlement

discussed.

offer have not been

settled

on

the terms

In Anthony Duran's case, CTX withdrew it Motion to

Enforce Settlement and sought a Writ of Restitution.

The case of

Rukavina v. Triatlantic Ventures, is currently on appeal, on other
grounds, before the Utah Supreme Court. (Appeal No. 950172).
B.

THE OPTION PROVISION IN THE LEASE AGREEMENT
IS AMBIGUOUS; THEREFORE, THE COURT ERRED
IN STRIKING EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE AND GRANTING
CTX'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS.
Because the disposition of a case on a judgment on the

pleadings denies the benefit of a trial on the merits, the court
must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing
party, and grant or affirm only when it appears that there is no
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set of circumstances alleged wherein a party may prevail. Themy v.
Seagull Enters., Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979) .
In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings the
court must view all facts alleged in the compliant as true, with
all inferences being resolved in favor of the non-moving party.
Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co.. 780 P.2d 827 (Utah App.
1989) .
The trial court should not have granted judgment on the
pleadings in this case.

In the pleadings filed by Rukavina he

claims that he is an owner of the property pursuant to the lease
and an option to purchase contained in the lease, which he timely,
or in good faith attempted to timely, exercise.

In accepting the

allegations in Rukavina's pleadings as true, the court could not
have granted judgment on the pleadings against Rukavina in this
case.

It may be found that Rukavina is entitled to possession

pursuant to the option contained in the lease, as a result of the
promises made by CTX, the waiver by CTX, a mutual mistake of the
parties at the time the option was entered into, or under the
Settlement Agreement entered into by CTX and Barney, wherein CTX
agrees to honor the lease and option on Rukavina's behalf.
Furthermore, the terms in the option provision are not
too indefinite, as a matter of law, to be enforceable, as a method
was agreed to at the time for calculating a purchase price for the
property.

This agreed method is definite enough for an option to

purchase real estate. Property Assistance v. Roberts, 768 P.2d 976
(Utah App. 1989) .

As argued further below, at a minimum, the
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language in the option provision is ambiguous, and parol evidence
should have been considered by the court in determining first,
whether the parties intended the option to be completely integrated
and

second,

the parties' agreement

as

to a purchase price.

Property Assistance v. Roberts, Id.
C.

THE OPTION AGREEMENT IS NOT AN INTEGRATED CONTRACT,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
PAROL EVIDENCE IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE LEASE
AGREEMENT WAS INTENDED AS AN INTEGRATED CONTRACT.
The question of

interpretation

of a contract

is a

question of law for the court. The court must determine by process
of interpretation what the writing means.

Before considering the

applicability of the parol evidence rule in a contract dispute, the
court must first determine whether the parties intended the writing
to be an integrated contract.

To resolve this question any

relevant evidence is admissible.

Union Bank v. Swenson. 707 P.2d

663, 665 (Utah 1985).

The trial court erred in failing to first

determine and rule on the issue as to whether the option was
intended as integrated contract before ruling on the admissibility
of parol evidence.

JEd. at 665.

The trial court should have considered all relevant
evidence, including the affidavits of the individuals negotiating
the contract, to determine if the contract was intended as an
integrated contract. See Ward v. Intermountain Farmers. 277 UAR 58
(Ut.App. 1995) (when determining whether a contract is ambiguous,
any relevant evidence must be considered.

Other wise the determi-

nation of ambiguity is inherently one-sided, namely it is based
solely on the "extrinsic evidence" of the judge's own linguistic
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education and experience. Although the terms of an instrument may
seem clear to a particular reader -including a judge- this does not
rule out the possibility that the parties chose the language of the
agreement to express a different meaning. A judge should therefore
consider any
intention).

credible

evidence

offered

to show the parties'

Id.

The

affidavits

provision was not

submitted

intended

as an

indicate

that

integrated

the

option

contract.

The

affidavits set forth the specific terms agreed to in explanation of
the language used

in the option provision

(last sentence of

paragraph 15), stating that, "Each agent shall obtain a separate
appraisal and at that time a fair sales price shall be determined."
Furthermore, parol evidence should be considered when it
appears that a complete and binding agreement may be voidable for
fraud, duress, mutual mistake or the like, or it may be illegal.
Warner v. Sirstins 838 P.2d 666, 669 (Ut.App. 1992) . Such invalidating causes need not and generally do not appear on the face of
the writing.

Therefore, parol evidence may be admitted to show

mutual mistake

occurring

when both parties, at

the

time of

contracting, share a misconception about a basic assumption or
vital fact, upon which they base their bargain. Id. at 669. This
is clearly shown in the affidavits submitted, as both parties
assumed

that the language they had chosen was sufficient to

determine a purchase price for an enforceable option to purchase.
Furthermore, even reading

the face of the contract

itself, indicates that the option provision was not intended as an
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integrated contract. Paragraph 15 states that "there are no terms
of this agreement different (sic) from any of the proceding (sic)
numbered paragraphs or in addition thereto except the following:H
(emphasis added).

The option provision then follows.

The option

provision therefore, clearly was not intended as an integrated
contract and the court should have considered all relevant evidence
in interpreting the option provision.
D.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING RUKAVINA'S MOTION
TO ENFORCE A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ENTERED IN ANOTHER
CASE, CTX PROPERTIES V. BARNEY, BASED ON A SEPARATE
CONTRACT FROM THE LEASE AGREEMENT RULED ON IN CTX'S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS.
The law in Utah is well settled that a third party

beneficiary to a contract has the right to enforce the terms of the
contract.

This includes third party beneficiaries of settlement

agreements.

L&A Drywall. Inc. v. Whitmore Construction, 608 P.2d

626 (Utah 1980).

See also Hansen v. Greenriver Group. 748 P.2d

1102, 1104 (Ut.App. 1988).
CTX and Barney, entered into a Settlement Agreement in
CTX Properties v. Eloise C. Barney. Civil No. 900903134 PR, and as
a condition of that settlement, Barney requested that CTX honor the
option provision with Rukavina.

The Settlement Agreement with

Barney specifically provides, in clear and unambiguous language,
that CTX will honor the option agreement contained in the lease
with Rukavina.
By filing this action CTX breached the terms of its
Settlement Agreement by asserting, that the option is unenforceable
and by

refusing

to honor

the option
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exercised by Rukavina.

Furthermore, any potential defense to the enforcement of the option
agreement was waived by CTX in the Settlement Agreement.

Surety

Life Ins. Co. v. Rupp.. 853 P.2d 366, 370 (Ut.App. 1992) (a party
may legally contract to waive a defense); Continental Bank & Trust
Co. v. Utah Sec. Mortcr. , 701 P.2d 1095, 1098 (Utah 1985), (finding
of trial court on summary judgment that unambiguous language in
guaranty agreement waives guarantors' defenses is affirmed).
Since Rukavina is a third party beneficiary to the
Settlement Agreement, which specifically provides that CTX will
honor the option entered into with Rukavina, and this is a separate
agreement from the lease itself, Rukavina's Motion to Enforce the
Settlement Agreement with Barney should not have been summarily
stricken by the Court based on the Court's interpretation of the
separate lease agreement entered into by Rukavina.
Rukavina is entitled to the enforcement of the terms of
the Settlement Agreement

with Barney

to protect

his rights.

Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1. 645 P.2d 608 (Utah
1982)

(action for specific performance of option agreement to

purchase realty granted and affirmed); Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627
P.2d 528 (Utah 1981); Garland v. Fleisch. 831 P.2d 107 (Utah 1992).
E.

THE APRIL
COURT FOR
THE COURT
THE APRIL

20, 1993 JUDGMENT WAS VACATED BY THE
LACK OF STANDING AND JURISDICTION;
ERRED IN RETROACTIVELY REINSTATING
20, 1993 JUDGMENT.

The trial court erred in reinstating the April 20, 1993
Judgment which was previously vacated for lack of standing and
jurisdiction. Utah Statute 16-10a-1502 U.C.A., precludes a foreign
corporation from bringing or maintaining an action in the State
- 32 -

until an application is filed with the division.

Therefore, the

court does not have jurisdiction over any matter brought by a
foreign corporation until an application is filed.

This standing

and thus, jurisdiction, cannot be applied retroactively.
The rule regarding

the construction

against retroactive application.
952 (Utah 1987).

of statutes is

Stephens v. Henderson, 741 P.2d

§ 68-3-3 U.C.A. specifically provides that a

statute shall not be retroactively applied, unless it is so
declared in the statute.

There is no such declaration in this

case.
Two exceptions to this rule have been recognized and
retroactive application has been allowed, when

(1) there is a

procedural amendment or (2) if the amendment is remedial, i.e.
intended to clarify how the earlier law should have been understood.
There

Kofoed v. Industrial Commission. 872 P.2d 484 (Utah 1994) .
is no procedural

or remedial

amendment

in this case;

therefore, the application giving rise to CTX's standing to bring
this action should not have been retroactively applied.
F.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
RUKAVINA'S MOTION TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT.
The trial court abused its discretion in not allowing

Rukavina to amend his complaint.

CTX was not unfairly prejudiced

and had plenty of opportunity to answer the amended complaint,
complete discovery and prepare for trial.
The

Third

Party

Defendants

(as principals

of

the

Plaintiff CTX) were well aware of the action, and Third Party
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Defendant Barney actually accepted service of the Third Party
Complaint and filed an Answer to the Third Party Complaint.
Rule 15 URCP, provides that a party may amend his
pleading by leave of court and that leave of court shall be freely
given when justice so requires.

The primary considerations in

considering a motion to amend are, whether the parties have
adequate notice to meet the new issues, and whether any party
receives an unfair advantage or disadvantage. Rinawood v. Foreign
Auto Works, Inc.. 786 P.2d 1350 (Ut.App. 1990) cert, denied, 795
P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); See also Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664
P.2d 455 (Utah 1983) (determination depends on whether opposing
party would be put to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue
adjudicated for which he had not had time to prepare).
In this case, there was no unfair advantage or unavoidable prejudice due to not enough time to prepare. On November 18,
1994, pursuant to the Court's own Order a Scheduling Conference was
held wherein cut-off dates and deadlines were set.

A discovery

deadline was set for February 28, 1995. A motion deadline was set
for December 9, 1994. The Court set a hearing date on all motions
for January 30, 1995 at 1:30. (Record 303).

Rukavina's Motion to

Amend was filed on the deadline set by the Court, December 9, 1994
(Record 310) and well before the discovery deadline.
CTX was not unduly prejudiced and had ample opportunity
to conduct further discovery and prepare for any new issues.
Rukavina's Motion to Amend should have been granted by the Court
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and the denial of Rukavina's Motion to Amend in this case was an
abuse of discretion.
G.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE THIRD
PARTY COMPLAINT FILED AGAINST WRIGHT AND BARNEY
PURSUANT TO RULE 4 URCP, WHEN BARNEY HAD ACCEPTED
SERVICE OF THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT AND HAD
ALREADY FILED AN ANSWER IN THE CASE.
Rule 4(b) URCP, provides that "in any action brought

against two or more defendants on which service has been obtained
upon one of them within the 120 days or such longer period as may
be allowed by the court, the other or others may be served or
appear at any time prior to trial."
The Third Party Complaint as against Barney should not
have been dismissed for untimely service under Rule 4 (b) URCP after
Barney agreed to accept service in the case and filed an Answer to
the Third Party Complaint.

Any claim regarding the untimely

service of Barney was thereby waived.

The Court's dismissal,

although without prejudice, greatly adds to the delay and cost of
litigation and therefore, should not be allowed in this case.
Rule 4 (b) URCP provides that once one defendant is served
the other defendants can be served or appear at any time prior to
trial.

This is to prevent the preclusion of adding additional

defendants after three months. Valley Asphalt, Inc., v. Eldon J.
Stubbs Contsr., Inc., 714 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1986).

Barney, one of

the Third Party Defendants in this case was served and therefore
Wright, as an additional Third Party Defendant in this action, may
be served at any time prior to trial.
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Id.

The trial court erred in dismissing the Third Party
Complaint against Wright under Rule 4 URCP.

The court certainly

erred in dismissing Barney from the case after Barney had already
accepted service of the Third Party Complaint and had filed an
Answer to the Third Party Complaint.
CONCLUSION
The

trial

court

erred

in

enforcing

the

settlement

agreement in this case, which was part of a global settlement of
four other cases, which was never agreed to by all the parties.
The court erred in failing to make an initial determination, considering all the evidence, as to whether the parties
intended the option provision to be an integrated contract, before
ruling on the exclusion of parol evidence.
The

trial

court

erred

in granting

judgment

on the

pleadings, finding the option provision too indefinite to be
enforceable, when there was a definite method agreed to for
calculating the purchase price.

The trial court erred in finding

that the opiton provision was not ambiguous, so as to allow parol
evidence to determine its meaning.
The trail court erred in striking Rukavina's Motion to
Enforce the Settlement Agreement entered in CTX v. Barney, a
separate case, when Rukavina was clearly an intended beneficiary.
The trial court erred in retroactively reinstating a
judgment entered when CTX had no standing and the court had no
jurisdiction over the matter.
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Finally, the trial court abused its discretion in denying
Rukavina's Motion to Amend and in dismissing the Third Party
Complaint, when Third Party Defendant, Barney had accepted service
and filed an Answer to the Third Party Complaint.
RELIEF SOUGHT
This Court should reverse the trial court's final Drder,
and find that there was no global settlement reached as the parties
discussed and CTX is not entitled to unilaterally change the terms
of the settlement discussed, to enforce settlement in this case,
while proceeding with litigation in this case as well as the other
cases.
This Court should find that the option provision was not
intended as an integrated contract and that it is ambiguous, thus
requiring the consideration of parol evidence.

This Court, upon

consideration of all the evidence, should find that there was a
definite method agreed to for calculating the purchase price, and
thus, the option is enforceable as a matter of law.
This Court should vacate the trial court's Judgment on
the Pleadings and allow Rukavina to file his amended pleadings, to
proceed against the Third Party Defendants, and be entitled to have
a hearing on the merits of his Motion to Enforce the Settlement
Agreement entered into between CTX and Barney.
DATED this 2nd day of April, 1996.
SMITH & HANNA

By: j^st*^+j/J~£&^C
Bfeage
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W/Call

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify on the 2nd day of April, 1996, two (2)
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT was mailed,
postage prepaid, to the following:
Paul T. Moxley
Robert E. Mansfield
PARRY, MURRAY, WARD & MOXLEY
1270 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

^ . ^ ^ W <XJ. ^xscst
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ADDENDUM
The trial court's ruling on
for Judgment on the Pleadings.

CTX's Motion

The trial court's Order vacating judgment.
The trial court's Order reinstating judgment.
The trial court's Second Revised Order
Enforcing Settlement and Entering Judgment.
The Notice of Appeal.
Judge Iwasaki's denial of Motion to Enforce
Settlement Agreement in ASR Inc. v. Mark
Duran, 920906315PR.
Notice of Withdrawal of Motion to Enforce
Settlement Agreement in CTX Properties v.
Anthony Duran, 930904765CN.
Judge Wilkinson's denial of Motion to Enforce
Settlement Agreement in Andy Rukavina v. Triatlantic Ventures. 910907087CV, Appeal No. 95
0172.

ADDENDUM A

PAUL T. MOXLEY (2342)
CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER (5050)
ROBERT E. MANSFIELD (6272)
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
One Utah Center
Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 537-5555
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CTX PROPERTIES, INC.,
corporation,

a Nevada

Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS, MOTION TO STRIKE
AND RESTITUTION OF PREMISES

v.
ANDY RUKAVINA,

Civil No. 920906316 PR

Defendant.

Judge Anne Stirba

Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to
Strike came on for hearing before the Honorable Anne M. Stirba on
the 5th day of April, 1993, at the hour of 1:30 o'clock p.m.

Paul

T. Moxley and Robert E. Mansfield of Campbell Maack & Sessions
represented Plaintiff.

Dennis L. Mangrum represented Defendant

Andy Rukavina.
The Court, having considered Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings and Motion to Strike and the memoranda submitted
in support of and in opposition thereto and having heard and
considered the arguments of counsel,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff's Motion to Strike extrinsic evidence raised

by Defendant in his Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings is hereby granted;
2.

Paragraph

15 of the Lease provision

is clear and

unambiguous as a matter of law in that it does not contain a
purchase price or a sufficiently definite method for determining
the purchase price;
3.

Paragraph 15 of the Lease provision constitutes nothing

more than an agreement to agree;
4.

Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is

hereby granted and Defendant is ordered to immediately vacate the
subject premises located at 5646 Magic Isle Lane, Murray, Utah, and
to return possession to Plaintiff; and
5.

Damages which Plaintiff has sustained as a result of

Defendant's unlawful detainer and an award of reasonable attorney's
fees, as provided for in Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10 (Supp. 1992),
shall be determined in a supplemental order.
Dated this

^ ^ W i a y of April, 1993.

ANNp M. STIRBA
District Court Judge
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Approved as to form this

Dennis Mangrum

day of April, 1993:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the
law firm of Campbell Maack & Sessions, One Utah Center, Thirteenth
Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and that
in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUBGMHNT Of* THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO
STRIKE was dopocited in LhU Uni Lea States T M M , i ^t.ihjy -UEgpaid,
addressed to the following this

T

Dennis L. Mangrum
7110 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

c:\WP51\REM\CTX\PLD\judgraent.ord
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day of April, 1993:

ADDENDUM B

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Sail Lake County Utah
M. Shane Smith (3007)
Douglas R. Short (5344)
SMITH 8c HANNA, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South State, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-8900

NOV 2 G jfe-j
\Cl/

Deputy Cleri

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CTX PROPERTIES, INC., A
NEVADA CORPORATION,
:
:

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

ANDY RUKAVINA, AN INDIVIDUAL

:
:
:

Defendant.

ORDER VACATING JUDGMENT

Civil No. 920906316R
Judge Anne M. Stirba

Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Judgment against Defendant,
Andy Rukavina, having come regularly before the Court, and the
Court having been fully advised in the premises, and for good cause
having

been

entered

in

shown, and based

on the Stipulation

open

Plaintiff

Court

that

be

of Defendant

allowed

to

retain

possession of the subject residence pending further hearing on this
matter:
IT

IS

HEREBY

ORDERED,

ADJUDGED

AND

DECREED

that

Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Judgment is granted, therefore the
order entered by this Court on April 20, 1993, declaring the option
agreement

unenforceable

is hereby vacated; Although

the court

reserves as a matter of law whether the prior judgment was void or
voidable;

IT BE AT FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff, CTX Properties,
remain in possession of the property pending further hearing of
this matter.

.

DATED this

^S

'

day of November, 1994
BY THE COURT:

Anne M. Sti
District Court
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

) duAl

(-

1 Moxley

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify on the cvc^

day of November, 1994, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER VACATING JUDGMENT was
delivered, to the following:
Paul T. Moxley
Gayanne Schmid
PARRY MURRAY WARD & MOXLEY
1270 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

r

(\
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ADDENDUM C

FILED IN CLSRK'S OFFICE

Salt Lake County Utah

m&i/t

Paul T. Moxley (2342)
Brad W. Merrill (6932)
PARRY MURRAY WARD & MOXLEY
1270 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-3434

Deputy CUwfc

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CTX PROPERTIES, INC. a Nevada
corporation,

v.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO REINSTATE JUDGMENT
ON THE PLEADINGS OR JUDGMENT
ON THE PLEADINGS AND DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE

ANDY RUKAVINA,

Civil No. 920906316 D R

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

Judge Anne Stirba

At a hearing before the Honorable Anne M. Stirba or the thirtieth day of
January, 1995, at the hour of 1:30 o'clock p.m. the court considered the following
Motions: Plaintiff's Motion to Reinstate Judgment and for judgment on the Pleadings;
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of Documents and Answers to interrogatories;
Defendant's Motion to Amend Answer to Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint:
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for Specific Enforcement of
Settlement Agreement; Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for Specific

$«$5'43r?

Enforcement of Option Agreement; and Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendant's
Motions for Partial Summary Judgement. Paul T. Moxley and Brad W. Merrill of Parry
Murray Ward & Moxley represented Plaintiff. Budge W. Call represented Defendant
Andy Rukavina.
As a preliminary matter, the Court recognized that Plaintiff's Motion for
Attorney's Fees is still pending and shall be determined in a subsequent order.
The Court, having considered these various Motions and the
Memorandum, affidavits and exhibits submitted in supoort thereof and raving
reviewed the entire file and heard ana consice-ed the arguments of counsel, and for
good cause appearing therefor

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED. ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff's Motion to Reinstate Judgment and for Judgment on the

Pleadings is hereby granted and the Court's April 20 ; 1993 Order Granting Plaintiff's
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is heresy reinstated;
2.

All of the Court's previous Endings of fact with regard to its April

20, 1993 Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for . jdgme-rt on the Pleadings are hereby
incorporated by reference into this O-Jer.
a.

Specifically

Paragraph 15 of r e Lease covision is clear a^d

unambiguous as a matter of law in that it dees not certain a purchase ence or a
sufficiently definite method for determining t h e purchase price:
b.

Paragraph 15 of the Lease provision constitutes nothing

2

more than an agreement to agree;
3.

The Court took under advisement whether Plaintiff's Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings should be converted to a Motion for Summan/ Judgment
insomuch as the Court considered and reviewed affidavits and exhibits submitted by
the parties and will subsequently render its own written Order;
4.

Defendant's Motion for Leave to Amend Answer to Counterclaim

and Third Party Complaint is hereby denied as untimely and prejudicial to Plaintiff;
5.

With regard to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of

Documents and Answers to Interrogatories, the Court directs counsel to cooperate to
accomplish all necessary discovery; but (a) Defendants are to produce their witness
list to plaintiffs without further delay; and, (b) Defendant's witness list is not protected
under the attorney client privilege or as attorney work product privilege;
8.

Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant's Motions for Summary

Judgment is hereby granted in that Defendant's claims in which his Motions for
Summary Judgment are based are denied due to the Court's denial of Defendant's
Motion for Leave to Amend Answer:
9.

Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Enforce

Settlement Agreement is hereby stricken;
10.

Defendant's Motion of Partial Summan/ Judgment to Enforce

Option Agreement is hereby stricken;
11.

Damages which Plaintiff has sustained as a result of Defendant's

3

W 5 49

unlawful detainer and an award of reasonable attorney s fees, as provided for in Utah
Code Ann § 78-36-10 (Supp 1994), shall be determined in a supplemental order

DATED this ^ T ^ V of

YSQ[

ANNE M STIRB
District Court Ju>

Approved as to form

Budge W Call
Attorney for Defendant
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7 1995.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on January 3 1 , 1995, a true and correct copy of
the ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REINSTATE JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS OR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR LEAVE was mailed, postage prepaid to the following:

M. Shane Smith, Esq.
Budge W. Call, Esq.
SMITH & HANNA
311 South State Street, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

•ewssi

ADDENDUM D

Paul T. Moxley, Esq. (#A2342)
Robert E. Mansfield, Esq. (#A6272)

PARRY MURRAY WARD & MOXLEY
1270 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3434

By

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CTX PROPERTIES, INC., a
Nevada Corporation,

v.

]
\
\
,
]|

\

< v > i - ^ - £; o^ as>^

ANDY RUKAVINA,

]\

Civil No. 920906316PR

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

SECOND REVISED ORDER
AND JUDGMENT

Z20ZW

The Honorable Anne M. Stirba

Plaintiff CTX Properties, Inc/s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement came on for
hearing before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Anne M. Stirba presiding, at the hour
of 3:00 p.m. on June 12, 1995. Plaintiff CTX Properties, Inc. was represented by its counsel,
Paul T. Moxley and Robert E. Mansfield of Parry Murray Ward & Moxley. Defendant Andy
Rukavina was represented by his counsel, Budge W. Call of Smith & Hanna, and third party
defendant Eloise Barney was represented by her counsel, Lynn Mabey.

^M$^

Based upon the memoranda filed in support of and in opposition to plaintiffs Motion
to Enforce Settlement Agreement, the arguments of counsel and for good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Shane Smith's letter dated March 16, 1995, which is attached as Exhibit "B" to

plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, is a clear
acceptance of Paul T. Moxley's letter dated March 14, 1995, which is attached as Exhibit "A"
to plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement.
2.

The settlement agreement was clear and unambiguous and the parties had a

meeting of the minds on all material terms involved in the settlement of the present case.
3.

The parties agreed to dismiss all claims which each party had against the other

party or its agents and that CTX Properties, Inc. would pay defendant Rukavina the sum of
$2,500.00.
4.

CTX Properties, Inc. has waived its requirement for a global settlement of all

cases in which it is involved with the defendant or the defendant's relatives.
5.

The waiver of this ancillary term by CTX Properties, Inc. does not affect the

settlement of the present case.
6.

Plaintiff CTX Properties, Inc/s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is

granted and the terms of the Settlement Agreement are adopted.
7.

All causes of action set forth in defendant Andy Rukavina's Counterclaim are

dismissed with prejudice.
8.

The Court previously dismissed without prejudice defendant Andy Rukavina's

Third Party Complaint on April 3, 1995.
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9.

However, the dismissal of the Third Party Complaint without prejudice is not a

ruling by this Court of the legal effect of the settlement agreement.
10.

All causes of action and claims set forth in plaintiff CTX Properties, Inc/s

Complaint are dismissed with prejudice.
11.

Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant Rukavina and against Plaintiff CTX

Properties, Inc. in the amount of $2,500.00.
DATED this°ft

day of A^ust, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

Anne M. Stirba
District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

M. Shane Smith
Budge W. Call
Attorneys for Defendant
Andy Rukavina
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing REVISED ORDER AND
JUDGMENT, was hand delivered this X-

day of August 1995, to the following:

M. Shane Smith
Budge W. Call
SMITH & HANNA
311 South State Street
Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
L. Benson Mabey
MURPHY TOLBOE & MABEY
124 South 600 East
Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
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ADDENDUM E

M. Shane Smith (3007)
Budge W. Call (5047)
SMITH Sc HANNA, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
311 South State, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-8900

o

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CTX PROPERTIES, INC.,
a Nevada corporation,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiff,
vs.
ANDY RUKAVINA,
Civil No. 920906316PR
Judge Anne M. Stirba

Defendant.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Defendant and Appellant,
Andy Rukavina, by and through his attorneys, M. Shane Smith and
Budge W. Call of Smith & Hanna, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court
the final Judgment of the Honorable Anne M. Stirba entered in this
matter on September 20, 1995.
This appeal is taken from the trial court's ruling on
Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement entered on
September

20, 1995, and

the

trial

court's

ruling

on

summary

judgment issued during the proceeding.
DATED this

y j

day of September, 1995.
SMITH & HANNA

^tfdqe W.^Call

v

iift8 § $ *<

ADDENDUM F

Paul T. Moxley, Esq. (#A2342)
Robert E. Mansfield, Esq. (#A6272)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
PARRY MURRAY WARD & MOXLEY
1270 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3434

SMfH<j HANNA

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ASR, INC., a Nevada Corporation,
Plaintiff,

}

v.

}

MARK DURAN and LYNETTE
DURAN, husband and wife,

}
}
}
}

Defendants.

ORDER

Civil No. 920906315PR
The Honorable Glen Iwasaki

Plaintiffs Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, Motion for Stay or for
Extension of Time, Motion to Dismiss Third Party Complaint and Motion for Sanctions and
Renewed Motion to Compel and Defendants' Motion to Amend and Motions for Summary
Judgment came on before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Glen Iwasaki presiding, on
May 22, 1995 at the hour of 11:00 a.m. Plaintiff was represented by its counsel, Robert E.
Mansfield of Parry Murray Ward & Moxley, and defendants Mark and Lynette Duran were
represented by their counsel, Shane Smith and Budge Call of Smith & Hanna.
Based upon the memoranda filed in support of and in opposition to the abovenamed motions, the argument of counsel and for good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs Motion to Specifically Enforce Settlement Agreement is

2.

The Court finds that there was no meeting of the minds as to the

denied.

essential terms of the Settlement Agreement.
3.

Defendants' Motion to Amend is denied as to all causes of action

regarding enforcement of the option provision.
4.

The Court finds that plaintiff would be prejudiced by the amendment of

the Counterclaim involving causes of action relating to the alleged option provision.
5.

However, defendants shall be entitled to file an amended complaint

asserting causes of action on defendants' claim for improvements to the subject property.
6.

Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Third Party Complaint is granted and

defendants' Third Party Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.
7.

Eloise Barney's Answer, Crossclaim and Third Party Complaint is

dismissed without prejudice.
8.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment regarding enforcement of

option provision is denied inasmuch as the Court previously has ruled on the enforceability of
the option provision and found that it is not enforceable.
9.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment seeking to enforce the

settlement agreement in the case of CTX Properties, Inc. v. Barney is not properly before the
Court inasmuch as plaintiff has not yet had an opportunity to respond to this motion.
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10.

Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days from the date hereof in which to

respond to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
11.

Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions and to Compel is stayed pending

plaintiffs submittal of specific deficiencies with defendants' discovery responses.
12.

The parties shall work together to set new dates for witness designation.

DATED this

day of May, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable Glen Iwasaki
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
SMITH & HANNA

Budge W. Call, Esq.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

_ day of May, 1995, a true and correct

copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand-delivered, to the following:
M. Shane Smith
Budge W. Call
SMITH & HANNA
311 South State Street
Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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ADDENDUM G

RECEIVED

MAY 2 3 1995
Paul T. Moxley (#A2342)
Robert E. Mansfield (#A6272)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
PARRY MURRAY WARD & MOXLEY
1270 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3434

SMITH &HANNA

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CTX PROPERTIES, Inc., a Nevada
corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.

ANTHONY DURAN, an individual; IHC
HOSPITALS, INC., a Utah corporation,
dba CREDIT ASSURANCE AGENCY;
SBK, Inc., a Utah Corporation,
dba STEPHEN WADE AUTOMOTIVE
GROUP; THE STATE OF UTAH, by and
through THE UTAH HIGHER
EDUCATION ASSISTANCE
AUTHORITY; UNIVERSITY
HOSPITAL; JOSEPH R. JOHNSON
AND ELOISE JOHNSON; AND
JOHN DOES 1-10,
Defendants.

ANTHONY DURAN,
Counterclaim Plaintiff,
v.

NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL
OF MOTION TO ENFORCE
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Civil No. 930904765CN

The Honorable William H. Bohling

CTX PROPERTIES, INC.,
Counterclaim Defendant,

ANTHONY DURAN,
Third-Party Plaintiff,

MICHAEL WRIGHT and
ELOISE C. BARNEY,
Third-Party Defendants.

TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that plaintiff CTX Properties, Inc., hereby withdraws
its Motion to Specifically Enforce Settlement Agreement in this case based on the grounds
that plaintiff will not receive the benefit of its bargain inasmuch as Judge Iwasaki has ruled '
that a settlement agreement in a companion case, which was part of the com deration for the
settlement of this case, was not reached.

us
DATED this

y&- day of May, 1995.
& MOXLEY

PauF T^#lox\ey, Es
Robert E. Mansfield, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff >

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing NOTICE OF
WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT was hand-

1

delivered, this J&

day of May, 1995, to the following:

M. Shane Smith
Budge W. Call
SMITH & HANNA
311 South State Street
Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

3

M4Y 2 3 ^ "
SMfTH & HANNA

Paul T. Moxley (#A2342)
Robert E. Mansfield (#A6272)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
PARRY MURRAY WARD & MOXLEY
1270 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3434

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CTX PROPERTIES, Inc., a Nevada

}

corporation,

}
Plaintiff,

}

v.

}

ANTHONY DURAN, an individual; MC
HOSPITALS, INC., a Utah corporation,
dba CREDIT ASSURANCE AGENCY;
SBK, Inc., a Utah Corporation,
dba STEPHEN WADE AUTOMOTIVE
GROUP; THE STATE OF UTAH, by and
through THE UTAH HIGHER
EDUCATION ASSISTANCE
AUTHORITY; UNIVERSITY
HOSPITAL; JOSEPH R. JOHNSON
AND ELOISE JOHNSON; AND
JOHN DOES 1-10,
Defendants.

}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}

ANTHONY DURAN,
Counterclaim Plaintiff,
v.

NOTICE OF HEARING

Civil No. 930904765CN

The Honorable William B. Bohling

CTX PROPERTIES, INC.,
Counterclaim Defendant,

ANTHONY DURAN,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
v.

MICHAEL WRIGHT and
ELOISE C. BARNEY,
Third-Party Defendants.

TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that plaintiff CTX Properties, Inc.'s Motion for Writ
of Restitution shall be heard before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable William B.
Bohling presiding, on Monday, June 5, 1995 at the hour of 10:00 a.m.
DATED this 3>

day of May, 1995.
IAY WARD & MOXLEY

4^*^4*0***

loxley, Esq.
Robert E. Mansfield, Eso*

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing NOTICE OF
HEARING was hand-delivered, this

_ day of May, 1995, to the following:

M. Shane Smith
Budge W. Call
SMITH & HANNA
311 South State Street, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Paul TT Moxley
Robert E. Mansfield
Attorneys for Plaintiff

3

ADDENDUM H

RECEfVED
MAY 1 8 1995
SMfTH&HANNA
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
RUKAVINA, ANDY
PLAINTIFF
VS
TRIATLANTIC VENTURE, INC
VIDEO SHOPPING MALL, DEFENDANT

CASE NUMBER 910907087 CV
DATE 05/17/95
HONORABLE HOMER F WILKINSON
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK DAG

TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

4-501 RULING
DEFENDANT MICHAEL WRIGHT'S MOTION TO VACATE NOTICE OF
APPEAL AND TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS DENIED.
CC: PAUL MOXLEY
KENNETH YEATES
RICHARD DAY
M. SHANE SMITH

